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eHealth FORUM 2016

MEDICAL DEVICE SECURITY



CENSUS
IT Security Works

ABOUT CENSUS S.A.

- We deliver security assessment services to customers worldwide
- Recent medical projects include:
 - Assessments of smart medical devices
 - Assessments of DICOM software components
 - Penetration tests to clinics
 - Assessment of platform for the exchange of medical data



“SMART” MEDICAL DEVICE CHARACTERISTICS


- Communication-enabled devices (Internet of Medical Things) capable of interacting with medical information systems
- Remote management
- Firmware updates
- Communication with vendor / clinic via special gateway



Examples of smart devices

TYPICAL ISSUES

- Security defects in the device software
 - may allow an unauthorised entity to **control** the device and **collect / tamper** device data
- Insecure setup (flat network, default passwords etc.)
 - may allow an unauthorised entity to gain **remote access** to the device (sometimes from any point in the hospital network)




```
526  
527  
528  
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531  
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533  
534  
535  
stringstream  
iLength = sInput.length();  
if (iLength < 4) {  
    again = true;  
    continue;  
} else if (sInput[iLength - 3] != '.') {  
    again = true;  
    continue;  
} while (++iN < iLength) {  
    if (isdigit(sInput[iN])) {  
        continue;  
    } else if (iN == (iLength - 3)) {  
        continue;  
    }
```



THE RISKS

- Casualties
- Severe degradation of services
 - e.g. destruction of blood stock
- Clinical data theft and disclosure
- Financial and reputation impact



BUT WHO WOULD EXPLOIT THESE?

- A terrorist ?
 - A nation-state actor ?
 - A thief ?
 - Someone working for a competitor (or an insurance company or ...) ?
 - An insider ?
 - Does it matter ?
-

MAJOR CHALLENGES

- Vendors tend to make minimum security efforts during development
- A security patch may take a VERY LONG time to be prepared and rolled out
- Doctors prefer to work with certain equipment based on non-technical factors
- Medical devices are not treated as critical infrastructure
 - Insecure setup and use
 - Vulnerability exploitation may go unnoticed

THE WAY FORWARD

- Governance
 - We need **information security officers** (not just IT officers) in medical institutions
- Awareness
 - Regular **security awareness training** for staff

THE WAY FORWARD

- Enhanced Device Certification Process

- Make security assessments part of the Device Certification process

1. Require a Secure SDLC-type lifecycle from the vendor
2. The certification body must carry out security assessments to the device independently



- Setup Evaluation

- Include security assessments in the Device Installation process

THE WAY FORWARD

- Security Architecture
 - **Control** physical, network and service access
 - **Audit** interactions (tie to per-user accounts, no common / default credentials)
 - **Protect** data storage and transmission

THE WAY FORWARD

- Openness
 - Information about critical security defects **must be disseminated** to all stakeholders
 - Third parties **must be allowed** to conduct security research on medical devices

QUESTIONS?

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Thank You!



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